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TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCES AND THE 
DECISIONS involving them are special. One 
reason the experiences are special is because 
of their epistemic inaccessibility: as individu-
als, we cannot accurately imagine and evalu-
ate them the way we ordinarily would. This 
leaves us without an internal guide. We can’t 
look within ourselves to accurately assess or 
forecast our response to the experience. So 
there’s a gap in our model for how to make 
the decision: a hole where we’d normally plug 
in the value of what it’s like to have the expe-
rience in order to evaluate it. If we can’t 
know how we’d value the options we are to 
choose between, we can’t make an informed, 
rational choice. 
Can we fill this gap by relying on what 
others can tell us? Should we replace our in-
ternal guide on value with the advice given 
by our best science and the most reliable tes-
timony we can find? Perhaps science can 
think clearly where we can’t, and guide us to 
act in the way that’s most likely to maximize 
our happiness. In essence, then, can we look 
to the science to tell us what we need to 
know? 
In one sense, yes. Expert advice solves the 
value gap problem, because it gives us infor-
mation about values that we can’t get for 
ourselves. In another sense, no. Telling us 
we’ll be happier by choosing one option over 
another can help us pick the option that is 
likely to maximize happiness, but it doesn’t 
do this by helping us understand what that 
option is like. For example, consider a con-
genitally blind adult who navigates the world 
well but who wants to have a retina opera-
tion. I can tell the blind man that if he be-
comes sighted, green will be his favorite col-
or, but this doesn’t teach him what seeing 
green is like. Similarly, I can tell a person that 
she’ll be happier if she becomes a mother, but 
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this doesn’t mean she knows what being a 
mother will be like. 
Knowing what your life will be like can be 
important when you make this kind of 
choice. Not merely because we care about the 
nature of lived experience. Although, for 
most of us, it does matter to us what our fu-
tures will be like – will our lives be happy? 
Will our choices make us feel fulfilled? – it 
isn’t just this. It’s also that making the choice 
often involves significant tradeoffs.  
If the blind man gains ordinary vision, his 
ability to navigate the world will likely de-
crease, since his cognitive abilities and skills, 
honed over a lifetime of blindness, will not 
adapt straightforwardly to life as a sighted 
person. He will likely experience significant 
changes in his relationships with others, es-
pecially those close to him, like his spouse or 
his children. People will treat him differently, 
and their expectations for him will change. A 
woman with a thriving career who takes time 
off to have a child will likely experience lower 
earnings and slower advancement. People 
will treat her differently, and their expecta-
tions for her will change. Perhaps her choice 
would be easy but for the fact that she lives in 
a world where becoming a mother entails the 
likelihood that she’ll experience significant 
career costs and incur heavy social and per-
sonal obligations. It is highly likely that she 
will have to give up something that she cares 
about dearly if she chooses to become a par-
ent. (As Paul Bloom points out in his essay, 
finding oneself in this type of choice situa-
tion is especially common in the United 
States.) Even if, on balance, a person will be 
happier after being transformed, the choice 
may come with serious costs, and knowing 
the nature of the life you are choosing can 
help you understand why these costs are the 
ones you are willing to bear.  
Moreover, this isn’t the only thing you 
need to make sense of when you consider a 
choice involving a transformative experience. 
Trying to decide how you’d like your future 
life to develop doesn’t just involve attempts 
to foresee what a transformative experience 
will be like. That’s because transformative 
experiences are special for more than just 
their epistemic inaccessibility: they are spe-
cial because they change who we are. In par-
ticular, they change some of our core prefer-
ences, in effect changing the kind of person 
we are. So your decision also involves at-
tempts to foresee what being this new “you” 
will be like. 
This means that the edifice of our choice 
model stands on shifting sands: in virtue of 
having the transformative experience we’ve 
chosen, we change what we care about. What 
is right for us to choose will change in virtue 
of making the choice itself. The trouble here 
comes from how, on the usual story, when 
you make a big decision, you are supposed to 
base your choice on what you care about 
most. But if who “you” are changes as part of 
the transformation you choose, and this new 
you is impossible to know (from the inside) 
ahead of time, then this ordinary story fails 
to guide you through a crucial point of ambi-
guity. When you base your choice on what 
you care about most, which “you” matters for 
your choice? Who you are now? – or the 




In Paul Bloom’s beautifully constructed 
dialogue with the vampire, he explores these 
ideas, focusing on how to draw on expert tes-
timony and what we know from the experi-
ence of others when making a transformative 
decision. Bloom’s argument with the vampire 
takes us through many of the relevant twists 
and turns. Should you become a vampire? 
You can’t know what it’s like unless you be-
come one. So how do you decide, especially if 
you are unsure? If you attend to your gut 
feelings, you shouldn’t. It’s gross and alienat-
ing and foreign. You’ll be happy you didn’t 
do it. If you attend to the expert testimony, 
you should. It’ll be liberating and wonderful 
and amazing. You’ll be happy you did it.  
This is the situation we can find ourselves 
in for many potentially transformative deci-
 Reply to Symposiasts 
 
359 
sions. In essence, when we lack the ability to 
assess the situation for ourselves, and espe-
cially when our gut feelings don’t coincide 
with the expert advice for a transformative 
decision, how should we choose? Following 
Bloom’s lead, we should remember that gut 
feelings can be misleading and not lose sight 
of the science that lights our way. So perhaps 
we should conclude that, when the expert 
testimony, or the science, tells us what will 
make us happiest in such a situation, we 
should simply choose that option. So: be-
come a vampire, since vampires just love be-
ing vampires. You’ll be fine. 
Maybe. I agree with Bloom that if empiri-
cal research can tell us about what can make 
us happiest, we should listen. In particular, 
even if it can’t teach us what the experience 
will be like, it may be able to tell us how we 
are likely to respond, or what we are likely to 
testify to afterwards. But: does this mean 
that, in this situation, the right thing to do is 
to just choose whatever seems most likely to 
make us happy? 
Not necessarily. That’s because this deci-
sion has a complex structure, one that re-
quires careful scrutiny. There isn’t a simple 
decision to make here, because there isn’t a 
simple explanation for how the action will 
affect you. As Bloom’s vampire observes: 
«you’re in a situation where the decision you 
[will make] turns out to be the best one, even 
though, when you look at it another way, 
[you’ll] concede it’s the worst one».1 What 
does this mean? 
It means that, if you choose to have the 
experience, it will change who you are. This 
affects the way we understand how the deci-
sion “turns out”.2 For if having the experi-
ence is what makes you happy that you’ve 
done it, then there isn’t an independent way 
of evaluating whether it’s right for you. 
Think about it this way: everyone who has 
had a frontal lobotomy seems very happy and 
content afterwards. Experts predict that if 
you do it, you’ll be happy too. But is this a 
good reason to have a frontal lobotomy?  
Of course not. Now, the decision to be-
come a vampire doesn’t involve a lobotomy, 
but if there is something about becoming a 
vampire that makes you want to be one, then 
the fact that people like you are happy when 
they become vampires doesn’t necessarily 
mean that you, as you are now, should want 
to become a vampire. What the testimony 
tells you is that vampires are very happy to be 
vampires. That is: the advice and testimony 
of those who were transformed matters, and 
certainly applies to people like you, but it ap-
plies to people like you who were reborn as 
vampires. And you, right now, are not a vam-
pire. Yes, if you were bitten, you’d become 
one, and it’s likely that you’d be happy if you 
did become one. But right now, why should 
you care about becoming something so alien 
to you – a vampire that drinks blood? Why 
should you care about what some alien ver-
sion of you – if you were so twisted as to 
choose to become a vampire – would enjoy? 
In other words: vampire testimony can apply 
to who you’d become. But right now, it 
doesn’t necessarily apply to you, the person 
making the choice, because you are not a 
vampire. 
Ultimately, what Bloom’s discussion with 
the vampire brings out so beautifully and 
clearly is that we need to think carefully 
about the reasoning we are using to make a 
transformative choice, because it isn’t just a 
choice about happiness. It’s a choice about 
what kind of person you want to be. And this 
isn’t something that experts, or even other 
people, should decide for you. There is a dis-
tinctive kind of authenticity that rational, 
transformative decision making requires of 
us, and once we understand this, we can dis-
tinguish between a merely perverse or gut-
level rejection of what experts recommend, 
versus an informed rejection of a particular 
kind of life. As Cass Sunstein points out in 
his On Freedom, reminding us of Huxley’s 
Brave New World, sometimes we prefer to 
choose unhappiness in exchange for the free-
dom to remain ourselves. 
 
“All right then”, said the Savage defiantly, 
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“I’m claiming the right to be unhappy.” 
 
“Not to mention the right to grow old and 
ugly and impotent; the right to have syph-
ilis and cancer; the right to have too little 
to eat, the right to be lousy; the right to 
live in constant apprehension of what 
may happen tomorrow; the right to catch 
typhoid; the right to be tortured by un-
speakable pains of every kind.”  
 
There was a long silence. 
 
“I claim them all”, said the Savage at last.3  
 
Authenticity, in transformative contexts, 
means you choose knowledgably, with un-
derstanding. If you choose to transform, in 
accordance with expert advice, you don’t 
choose merely because you think you’ll be 
happy with your choice afterwards. You 
choose because you want to discover what 
it’s like to become that new self, that new 
kind of person. If you choose not to trans-
form, perhaps choosing a path that will bring 
suffering and loss, you do so because you pre-
fer not to be that kind of self. Perhaps you 
choose to stay much the same, to embrace 
your current self, embracing your current 
values. Or perhaps you find yourself choos-
ing between transformative options, and so 
you must choose to discover one kind of life 
over another. If you are choosing knowledg-
ably and authentically, you choose knowing 
that the deep structure of the choice con-
cerns the kind of self you want to become. 
So a transformative choice, at bottom, 
isn’t just about maximizing happiness. It’s 
about deciding whom you want to be. If you 
choose to become a vampire, it isn’t simply 
because, after listening to the experts, you 
learn that it’s simply the right choice for you. 
Rather, if you choose to become a vampire, 
with full understanding of what your choice 
involves, your choice is explicitly one of re-
construction. You choose to give up your 
human life to discover the life of a vampire. 
Instead of caring about human things, you’ll 
care about vampire things. You exchange life 
in the sun for life in the shadows.  
And if you choose to remain human, it 
isn’t simply because you are being perverse, 
or failing to understand that as a vampire 
you’d have been happier that way. If you 
choose not to become a vampire, with full 
understanding of what your choice involves, 
your choice is explicitly one that rejects the 
self-reconstruction that is part and parcel of 
the act. You choose to keep your human life, 
and human cares, and reject the desires of a 
vampire life.  
Once we see the structure, we can use it to 
better understand the kind of ambivalence 
some people experience when faced with big 
life decisions like whether to have a baby. 
The same way of understanding the choice is 
available to those who are deliberating 
parenthood, for, in essence, this deliberation 
has the same structure as the vampire deci-
sion. Should you become a parent? Perhaps 
you are deeply ambivalent. You’re told you’ll 
experience joy and meaningful love. Parents 
tell you they are so happy they’ve done it. 
Yet, especially if you are female, if you have a 
baby, you’ll take a career hit. Your goals of 
travel and success may become unattainable.   
If you find your intuitions about how to 
choose being pulled in contrary directions, 
the inaccessibility of knowing what this life-
defining experience will be like leaves you 
without an internal guide. But, as with the 
vampire choice, the solution is not to have 
others tell you what to do, or to unreflective-
ly choose based on what psychologists tell 
you will make you happy. That’s because, 
again, the choice isn’t merely about what 
would make you happy. It’s about which fu-
ture self you want to discover. 
If you authentically and rationally choose 
to become a parent, you choose to recon-
struct yourself and your life around your 
child. Authentically and rationally choosing 
to become a parent means choosing to dis-
cover a new kind of self, a new way to live 
your life, one that you can’t know until you 
actually become that self. Authentically and 
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rationally refusing to become a parent means 
that you choose to remain childless, not be-
cause you know what being a parent is like, 
but because you choose to keep your current 
life and to be your current self, at least for the 
time being. 
This allows us to explain why we can re-
ject the paternalistic idea that people who 
choose not to have children are simply una-
ble to recognize what’s best for them. Even if 
they’d be happier as a parent, they may reject 
this, choosing authentically to remain who 
they are. In rejecting parenthood they are 
choosing in accordance with their current 
preferences, in accordance with who they are 
now. It isn’t that they somehow lack the self-
awareness needed to recognize what they re-
ally, down deep, should prefer, or that they 
are being obtuse or perverse. Instead, they 
are authentically embracing their current 
selves. 
And on the other side, those who authen-
tically choose to become parents are embrac-
ing the unknown. They are opening them-
selves up to the joy and suffering and discov-
ery of transformation, and willing to do the 
work of reconstructing themselves. They are 
not choosing to become parents because they 
already know what it will be like, or because 
society pushes them in that direction (this is 
a point of contact with Sartre and Beauvoir). 
They are not choosing parenthood simply 
because they have been told by the experts 
that it will make them happier. Rather, they 
are choosing it in order to discover who they 
will become, in order to discover what this 
new life will bring.  
 
** 
This brings us to Jenann Ismael’s charac-
teristically deep and engaging criticism of my 
approach. On my view, the special kind of 
unknowability that transformative decision-
making brings forces us to confront a basic 
feature of modern life. Even apart from the 
ordinary types of contingency that we con-
front daily, we must recognize that, for cer-
tain kinds of big life decisions, we cannot 
know who we are making ourselves into until 
we actually take the plunge. If living involves 
this kind of choosing to become an unknown 
self, how can we do so authentically? Ismael 
presses me to make my ideas here clearer, 
and to be more open to giving imagination 
and uncertainty a central role in living mean-
ingfully. 
Ismael is correct to note that I am teasing 
out an element of authenticity that is differ-
ent from the Sartrean concept. My concern is 
not, in the first instance, with determining 
whether your actions flow from your true self 
rather than some externally imposed authori-
ty. (Although, as I noted above, this concern 
arises when we contemplate the role for ex-
pert testimony in our decision.) Rather, my 
primary concern is with how we are to make 
rational and reasonable sense of our lives, 
and to expect things from ourselves, given 
the uncertainty and unknowability of who we 
might become. We cannot eliminate this 
kind of unknown, nor should we pretend it 
does not exist. Ismael says it very beautifully 
when she concludes «Living should be about 
transformation and genuine transformation 
involves uncertainty».4 
In the end, I want us to embrace this un-
certainty, to embrace knowing what we can-
not know, and to embrace the discovery that 
comes when we choose. Authenticity in 
choice, then, means choosing for the right 
reasons, and in the right way, understanding 
that your choice may change who you are, in 
ways that you cannot foresee until you un-
dergo the change itself. We should under-
stand and judge ourselves and others in the 
richer and more subtle way that this perspec-
tive entails. In particular, in transformative 
contexts we should not always expect people 
to know ahead of time what they are getting 
themselves into, even if we still hold them re-
sponsible for their choices. We can then sep-
arate responsibility for a choice from praise 
and blame for an outcome, and allow that, in 
some contexts, a person couldn’t have fore-
seen who she’d become even if we hold her 
responsible for her choice. 
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Thus, I agree with Ismael about the im-
portance of understanding the uncertainty 
that transformation entails. I also agree with 
her that we should try to cultivate our imagi-
nation in order to better understand those 
who are very unlike ourselves, those who 
have had transformative experiences that we 
have not had. On this point, however, our 
views do not completely align. In particular, I 
am much more skeptical than she is about 
our ability to use our imagination to under-
stand, from the inside, those who have had 
experiences that are very different from ours. 
I agree that we can train our imagination to 
do a better job than it otherwise could, and 
that trying to understand others is important. 
But I’m skeptical about how much we can re-
ally achieve here. For example, I do not think 
I can know what it’s like to be attacked, or 
diagnosed with a terminal illness, or to lose a 
parent, without actually having had those 
kinds of experiences. (Ismael agrees with me, 
of course, that you cannot know everything 
important about what an experience is like in 
these cases, but I think she is more optimistic 
about how effectively we are able to imagine 
ourselves into such situations.) 
I maintain that, without the right experi-
ences, try as we might, we still can’t use art or 
imagination to leap the epistemic wall.5 Even 
with the best effort and will in the world, 
there is a crucial element that evades us. 
Novels, documentaries, and art can teach us 
much, and they do help us sympathize with 
those who have suffered. Yet, they inevitably 
and essentially fall short. We cannot use 
them to cross the boundary from observer of 
experience to subject of experience. They 
bring us important information, they help us, 
and yet, they are not enough to teach us, to 
really teach us, what such experiences are 
like.  
If you doubt this, try telling a veteran that 
you know what it is like to have fought in Vi-
etnam because you’ve seen a graphic film 
about the war. Or try telling a sufferer of 
breast cancer that you know what it’s like to 
receive a terminal diagnosis because you’ve 
read a novel where the narrator takes you 
imaginatively through that kind of experi-
ence. I think you will find that they will resist 
your optimism, and I suspect that you will 
also sense, intuitively, that there is likely 
something that you are missing. 
So the epistemic wall remains. However, 
what we can do, following Ismael’s insights, 
is to try harder. We should try to use our im-
agination to make us more sympathetic to 
the testimony of others and attach a higher 
credence to their judgments than we might 
otherwise do, were we to rely solely on what 
we can glean from our own imaginative as-
sessments. In particular, because I suspect 
that the inaccessibility of the experiences of 
people who are very different from ourselves 
can be the source of epistemic injustice, we 
must work to correct for this, granting that 
they might have privileged access to the na-
ture of these experiences. Once we recognize 
that there may be principled epistemic rea-
sons for why we cannot, no matter how hard 
we try, grasp the degree and nature of the 
pain and suffering of someone who faces 
challenges quite different from any we’ve 
faced, we can improve our moral and practi-
cal understanding, judgment, and assessment 
of their acts. 
 
** 
Ismael and Bloom encourage us to see 
transformation as part of life, and to see the 
value of it. I agree. Like Ismael, I also think 
that we should learn to understand and em-
brace the uncertainty it brings. If we do so, 
when we choose to transform, we can do so 
both rationally and authentically. Doing so 
requires us to recognize that we cannot al-
ways see forward clearly, but to accept this as 
an element of making the decision. This the-
oretical conclusion raises practical concerns 
for real world transformative decision mak-
ing. How are we to do this? How should we 
approach these decisions? 
The practical and psychological puzzles of 
transformative decision making are high-
lighted by John McCoy and Tomer Ullman’s 
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incredibly interesting contribution, which 
points us towards new and exciting ways to 
combine empirical and philosophical ap-
proaches to the questions surrounding the 
metaphysics and epistemology of the self as it 
relates to decision making. They introduce a 
new puzzle: what’s the source of the decision 
agony that (real life) transformative choice 
can bring? As they point out, transformative 
decisions can be agonizing when we confront 
them in real life. What’s the source of this 
agony? How does this relate to the computa-
tional process of transformative decision-
making?  
Their paper brings out a number of new 
and fascinating points. They note how trans-
formative decisions can seem fun when they 
are merely imagined, contrasting this to the 
difficulty of making them in real life. More-
over, as they point out, part of the computa-
tional task of assessing preferences involves 
the job of forming your preferences in the 
first place. If your decision model is incom-
plete because of the epistemic inaccessibility 
of the transformative option, you may not 
have the resources to perform your task.  
To separate the phenomenological out 
from the computational, McCoy and Ullman 
consider a Decision Making Machine 
(DMM) that cannot deliberate using a sim-
ple, fully specified model.6 Like an ordinary 
person in a real life case, it cannot know the 
right subjective values, so it faces an epistem-
ic wall. It cannot make a rational choice if it 
must choose based on comparing what its 
outcomes would be like. Exploring the way a 
DMM would deliberate in this context can 
help us get a better sense of the computa-
tional tasks involved in making a transforma-
tive choice. In turn, this may help us to an-
swer the key question: what is the source of 
the decision agony that arises in real life 
transformative contexts? 
It’s not merely that the stakes are high, 
because an ordinary high stakes choice 
wouldn’t cause such agonizing in a person, 
much less a machine.. It’s not merely that it 
takes a lot of computational resources to per-
form the task. It’s not merely because the 
DMM can’t assign values to all of its options, 
because even ordinary people report that im-
agined transformative decision making is en-
joyable to contemplate and engage in.7 
The DMM thought experiment suggests 
that something deeper is going on. If a DMM 
wouldn’t agonize, then it isn’t a simple mat-
ter of computation that creates the difficul-
ties. McCoy and Ullman suggest a plausible 
alternative: when a person faces a transforma-
tive decision, this creates, at once, the need to 
face uncertainty while shrinking one’s oppor-
tunity to live different kinds of lives. Choos-
ing to transform is choosing to cordon off fu-
ture possibilities, forcing you to shut the gate 
on some of your possible future selves. Not 
being sure which self to give up, combined 
with an epistemic wall that makes you unable 
to see down each possible path before reject-
ing it, creates agony. When you make a trans-
formative choice, you must leave these other 
paths behind, forever unexplored. 
If who you are is in part a matter of how 
you’d respond to different possible changes 
in yourself and your environment8, we can 
see how the agony of decision making has 
clear connections to the philosophical ques-
tions I’ve been raising about authenticity and 
the existential dilemmas about whom to be-
come.9 Which selves can you bear to give up? 
Which selves do you choose to embrace? 
Which selves are too dangerous for you to 
allow yourself to even consider? These and 
other suggestions raised by McCoy and 
Ullman are philosophically interesting, and 
even more excitingly, can show us how to 
frame some of the questions surrounding 
transformative decision making in produc-
tive, testable ways. 
 
** 
If the agony of transformative decision 
making comes, at least in part, from how a 
decision requires us to shut out possible 
selves; to shut away possible lives, then in 
contexts where we can’t “have it all”, the ag-
ony may be especially keen. That is, often, a 
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transformative choice involves important 
tradeoffs. It comes with a cost.  
Recall our original examples of a congeni-
tally blind man who is contemplating gaining 
ordinary vision, and of a woman with a thriv-
ing career and social life who is contemplat-
ing motherhood. In both of these examples, 
the decision is hard in part because the world 
is not structured in ways that accommodate 
these choices. If you are not congenitally 
blind, the world is organized around you and 
others whose dominant sense modality is vi-
sion, and so you don’t have to make hard 
choices about whether you prefer autonomy 
to having the chance to live with your family 
as a sighted individual. If you are not a pro-
fessional woman considering motherhood, 
you don’t face the difficult tradeoffs that 
stem from the ways that contemporary wom-
en still can’t “have it all”. 
We can now see the connection to Krister 
Bykvist’s interesting and critical contribution 
to the discussion.10 Bykvist, one of the 
founders of the contemporary discussion of 
personal transformation,11 rightly situates my 
work in current debates over the nature of 
decision making involving known unknowns 
(sometimes described as “unknown un-
knowns”). For example, the possibility of de-
veloping an artificially intelligent agent (an 
AI) that could surpass anything a human 
could do brings many unknowns. How are 
we to decide whether to create such an AI, or 
if we do create it, what kinds of possibilities, 
opportunities, and dangers does it bring? 
How are we to control it? It’s safe to say that 
at this point, we know that we don’t know.  
Such an AI brings many known unknowns, 
and with it, many significant challenges for 
rational decision making.  
However, Bykvist wants to separate my 
account of epistemic transformation from 
the discussion of personal transformation 
when discussing life-defining choices, hoping 
to hive off contemplation of the unknown 
from contemplation of self-change. Unfortu-
nately, such a separation cannot succeed. Ep-
istemic transformation in life-defining cases 
is inseparable from the account of personal 
transformation, because such cases are pre-
cisely those where a profound epistemic 
transformation scales up into a personal 
transformation. It is because transformative 
experiences are both epistemically and per-
sonally transformative that we must attend 
to the nature of the lived experiences that 
they bring, that is, what the outcomes would 
be like, and consider the personal implica-
tions of decisions involving them. 
A central feature of the dispute between 
us concerns the balance one should strike be-
tween the contribution made by our assess-
ment of objective values as opposed to our 
assessment of subjective values. I think both 
matter: we care about both kinds of value. 
Bykvist disagrees with me on the importance 
of assessing subjective value for transforma-
tive decisions, pressing me to include more 
consideration of objective moral values when 
discussing transformative decision making. I 
take the point: I absolutely agree that objec-
tive moral values need to play a role in who 
we make ourselves into, just as much as I 
think they should play a role in the more or-
dinary choices we make every day.  
My view is not that the puzzles of trans-
formative decision making arise only when 
we can exclude consideration of objective 
values. It is not that we put the objective val-
ues aside. Not in any way. Rather, my point is 
that the puzzles of transformative decision-
making arise because, for many of these in-
tensely personal, life-defining choices, we 
cannot rely solely on objective considera-
tions. They do not decide the matter, and so 
there is an important role for subjective con-
siderations as well. 
The importance of assessing subjective 
values can be most apparent when a person 
has to make a life choice in a world that has 
not been set up in ways that accommodate 
her situation, where there is no objective 
moral prerogative. Think back to our exam-
ples of the congenitally blind man or the pro-
fessional woman, making hard choices in an 
unfriendly world, and recall McCoy and 
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Ullman’s  insightful discussion of the cogni-
tive difficulties and decision agony with 
transformative choices. 
We agonize over such choices. Why? Not 
because we don’t know what the objective 
moral values are. When we agonize over 
transformative choices, the primary source of 
our agony seems to stem from our inability to 
determine and decide between our subjective 
preferences and subjective values. Not be-
cause the objective values don’t matter, but 
because the objective values by themselves 
are insufficient to determine one path over 
another, and we care deeply about the subjec-
tive elements involved. In the real world, we 
rarely find ourselves in a situation where the 
objective moral guidelines point us clearly 
down one path as opposed to another, and in 
cases of transformative decision-making, we 
think our subjective preferences matter, for 
we are choosing whom to become, and whom 
to reject. Perhaps, as McCoy and Ullman’s 
piece suggests, the essence of the subjective 
difficulty is that the choice requires a person 
to permanently choose between selves, to 
shut off one self as opposed to another. 
Without the ability to see into one’s prospec-
tive futures, it can be agonizing to try to 
make an informed choice about which self to 
give up and which self to keep. 
So the cases of transformative choice that 
I am focusing on are cases where a person 
must make a hard decision, one that has dif-
ferent subjective costs and benefits depend-
ing on what is chosen. When choosing, the 
blind man wants to consider the subjectively 
positive value of a life filling with things like 
being able to watch movies and sunsets with 
his family members when he decides whether 
to become sighted, and to contrast it with the 
subjectively negative values that come from 
losing his comfort and ability to successfully 
navigate his world. (Those who have grown 
up blind often develop keen auditory and 
proprioceptive abilities to navigate the world 
that are irreplaceably lost when they gain the 
capacity to see, and for various physical and 
cognitive reasons, the new visual abilities 
cannot compensate for these losses.) He can’t 
have a life that is sighted if he keeps his cur-
rent life, so which does he prefer? When 
choosing, the woman who is deliberating 
over motherhood wants to consider the sub-
jectively positive joy of having a baby in or-
der to compare it to the subjectively positive 
value of having a successful career unfettered 
by family constraints. She can’t have both, so 
which life does she prefer?  
In these cases, a person must choose be-
tween different kinds of lives, giving up one 
kind of life for another. In such cases, it is 
natural to want to know what each kind of 
life would be like, that is, to know the subjec-
tive value of each kind of life one could have. 
These subjective values are not merely “phe-
nomenological values, as such”, but rather, 
values of lived experiences, the value of living 
a life like this versus living a life like that. To 
choose, irreversibly, one sort of life for the 
other, and to do so in an informed way, re-
quires a careful consideration of the subjec-
tive values involved. 
Moreover, the assessment of the subjec-
tive values of these experiences requires an 
understanding of their phenomenal charac-
ter. As I argue in my book, experience teach-
es us how to value: the phenomenology un-
locks the content for the knower. While we 
may be able to make a conceptual distinction 
between the phenomenal and the nonphe-
nomenal, given the way that actual human 
psychology works, in cases of transformative 
experience we cannot have the requisite 
nonphenomenal knowledge of the lived ex-
perience without first gaining phenomenal 
knowledge of the lived experience. For ex-
ample, without actually discovering what it 
will be like to stand in the identity-changing, 
loving attachment to the actual child I create 
(or adopt), I cannot know how I’ll experience 
and thus respond to the various things I’ll 
need to give up and the various things I’ll 
gain through becoming a parent. (As every 
parent knows, reading picture books to a 
toddler or singing a child to sleep has a spe-
cial kind of quality when the child is one you 
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love and cherish as your own. The experience 
is different, somehow, and more subjectively 
valuable, when it’s your own child. This plays 
out, in ways large and small, for many choices 
in your life, for example, when you choose to 
read and play with your baby instead of 
completing an important work project.) 
When a choice is easy, because there isn’t 
really anything that central or important to 
one’s identity that one must give up, perhaps 
we can treat subjective values as an indul-
gence, a mere gloss on what’s really important. 
But a context where the choice is hard, where 
one can’t “have it all”, one wants to know 
what one is giving up in order to understand 
what is being lost forever. This is why caring 
about the nature of your lived experience is 
not mere “texture fetishism”, as Bykvist sug-
gests. It is not selfishness, nor an abandon-
ment of objective moral values. It is, rather, 
something we turn to in order to help us 
make an informed life choice that involves 
significant tradeoffs. An attempt to assess 
subjective value is an attempt to respect the 
nature of one’s inner life and the inner lives 
of others, so one can decide what to reject 
and what to keep, as responsibly and authen-
tically as possible. If this sort of caring about 
the nature of your future is “texture fetish-
ism”, then it is the diagnosis for those of us 
who refuse to ignore human feelings and 
human sensibility.   
In my work, I want to grant the im-
portance of subjective assessment and subjec-
tive value to how we think about our lives 
and the lives of others, while denying that we 
can assess these values in many kinds of 
transformative contexts. But the solution is 
not to hide in our ivory tower, denying the 
importance of emotion and feeling in the 
hopes that this will somehow make us ration-
al. Instead, we must face the difficulties, and 
look for alternative models, ones that allow 
us to embrace revelation, feeling, and the im-
portance of discovery. 
 
** 
To close, I wish to thank all of my critics 
for their excellent, insightful, and impressive 
contributions. I’m honored to have such a dis-
tinguished set of commentators engage with 
my work, and to have the chance to respond 
to their thoughtful and penetrating remarks. I 
thank them for their time and care, and I am 
grateful for the way they have pushed me to 
think harder and better about transformative 
experience and decision making. 
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